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QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
The question presented for review on the appeal of the 
plaintiffs is whether the lower court was correct in granting 
summary judgment to the defendant Newspaper Agency Corporation 
(hereinafter "NAC") on the plaintiff's claim against NAC for 
punitive damages for the actions of NAC's non-supervisory 
employee, the co-defendant Donald Rogers (hereinafter 
"Rogers"), under the facts of this case as found by the lower 
court for the purposes of NAC's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment on punitive damages. This question involves the 
determination of two issues: 
1. Under what circumstances, if any, can an employer 
be held liable in punitive damages in Utah for the tortious 
conduct of an employee? 
2. What are the standards in Utah for the imposition 
of punitive damages? 
The questions presented for review on the appeal of 
the defendants are: 
1. Does Utah recognize a cause of action for 
emotional distress to one "within the zone of danger" who 
witnesses injury to another? 
2*. If Utah does recognize such a cause of action, 
are the claims of Ray C. Johnson barred by Utah Code Annotated 
§ 31-41-9? 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves a motor vehicle-pedestrian 
accident* The plaintiffs* Amended Complaint seeks, as against 
the individual defendant Donald Rogers and his employer NAC, 
jointly and severally, compensatory damages for the wrongful 
death of the plaintiff's minor decedent; compensatory damages 
for the plaintiff Raymond Johnson for physical injuries and 
emotional distress; compensatory damages for the plaintiff 
Frances Johnson for physical injuries and emotional distress; 
and "punitive damages against defendant Rogers in the amount o 
One Million Dollars ($1,000,000), . . . punitive damages 
against defendant NAC in the amount of One Million Dollars 
($1,000,000), imputed to it by virtue of the actions of 
defendant Rogers, and . . . punitive damages against defendant 
NAC in the amount of Ten Million Dollars ($10,000,000), for it 
own separate and independent action," Discovery has included 
written interrogatories, the exchange of documents and the 
taking of oral depositions of witnesses. 
On December 10, 1984, NAC moved the trial court for 
partial summary judgment on punitive damages. The matter was 
argued before the court on February 8, 1985. On March 22, 
1985, NAC filed a motion with the court seeking dismissal or 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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partial summary judgment with regard to the claims of the 
plaintiffs for recovery for emotional distress. 
On March 25, 1985, the trial court issued its 
Memorandum Decision granting NAC's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment on punitive damages. On March 26, 1985, the defendant 
Rogers moved the court for partial summary judgment on the 
issue of punitive damages. On March 28, 1985, the defendant 
Rogers moved this court for partial summary judgment with 
regard to the plaintiffs' claims for recovery for emotional 
distress. On April 2, 1985, the court heard argument on 
plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration of NAC's motion for 
partial summary judgment on punitive damages and on motions 
respecting negligent infliction of emotional distress, and 
granted the defendants' motions to dismiss those claims with 
regard to the plaintiff Frances C. Johnson but denied the 
defendants' motions to dismiss those claims with regard to Ray 
C. Johnson. On April 5, 1985, the court entered its Partial 
Summary Judgment on the issue of punitive damages as to the 
defendants Rogers and Newspaper Agency Corporation; and on 
April 25, 1985, the plaintiffs filed a petition before this 
court for permission to appeal that Partial Summary Judgment. 
The defendants filed a petition to appeal the trial court's 
rulings with regard to the emotional distress claims. 
-3-
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On July 22, 1985, the plaintiffs filed a motion with 
this court for summary reversal, and on August 5, 1985, the 
defendants filed a motion for summary reversal regarding Ray C. 
Johnson's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
On August 27, 1985, this court denied both petitions 
for summary disposition. 
An additional party in the case below was the Between 
Friends Club, a private club against whom relief was sought 
under the Utah dram shop act. Between friends settled with all 
parties for payment to the plaintiffs of fifty thousand 
dollars. Subsequently, NAC filed an offer of judgment for one 
hundred twenty-five thousand dollars. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant Donald Rogers was employed by the 
Newspaper Agency Corporation in May of 1980 (Deposition of 
Terry Northrup, May 5, 1983, page 11). At the time he was 
hired, he was recommended as an excellent employee by his 
former employer McQuaid Towing (Northrup, page 12). At that 
time, Rogers' driver's license record indicated that he had a 
Utah chauffeur's license in good standing, with one ticket 
(Id.). Rogers was hired by Terry Northrup, who was to be his 
immediate supervisor. At the time he was hired, there was no 
-4-
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indication on his driving record that he had ever been arrested 
for driving under the influence of alcohol/ and Mr. Northrup 
was not aware that Rogers had a record of such an arrest some 
years previously in the state of Oregon (Northrup, page 13)• 
Prior to April of 1982, Rogers was a good employee whose record 
indicated no adverse personnel actions, or warnings. 
At the time that Donald Rogers was hired by NAC, NAC 
had adopted written "NAC Rules of Conduct and Office Rules" 
which were presented to all NAC employees at the time they were 
hired for their review and signature (Northrup, p. 24-25). A 
copy of the "NAC Rules of Conduct and Office Rules", from 
Rogers' personnel file, is attached to the deposition of Terry 
Northrup as Exhibit "2", and attached hereto as Exhibit "A". 
The document lists 12 rules "violation of any of which is just 
cause for discipline or discharge." Four of the twelve rules 
are underlined. Rule number four, one of the underlined rules, 
reads as follows: "4. Being under the influence of, or 
possessing or using alcohol or illegal drugs during work 
time." At the bottom of the document is the following 
handwritten sentence: "I have read and fully understand the 
above violations with emphasis on those areas underlined." 
Underneath this handwritten sentence is the date "1-7-81" and 
the signature of the defendant Donald Rogers. 
-5-
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Donald Rogers had not been originally hired as a 
driver, but rather as a dock worker on the newspaper loading 
dock (Northrup, p. 35; Rogers, 1982, p. 20). He would 
occasionally fill in as a driver, and in January of 1982, began 
filling in as a driver on the Park City run (Northrup, page 
37). Prior to this period of time Rogers worked on the day 
shift, and was not working on the dock or driving at night 
(Second Deposition of Donald Rogers, October 3, 1984, at page 
21, 22). 
For approximately 6 months to a year prior to the 
accident that is the subject of this action, Donald Rogers fell 
into a pattern of daily drinking (Rogers, 1984, page 12). 
Rogers' drinking was done almost exclusively after work, and 
primarily by himself (Rogers, 1984, page 13, 14, 15, 16, 17). 
On April 16, 1982, the defendant Donald Rogers, while 
driving the NAC pickup truck which he used for the Park City 
run, was involved in a vehicle/pedestrian accident which 
resulted in the death of the plaintiff's son. At the time of 
the accident, Ray C. Johnson, David's father, was in the 
general area where the accident occurred. Frances C. Johnson, 
David's mother, was not. Although Ray C. Johnson did not 
actually see the truck collide with his son, he did find his 
son under the wheels of the truck. Mr. Johnson received some 
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minor injury himself either as a result of being hit by the 
truck/ or being hit by a cement pillar at the time of the 
accident. 
Rogers was arrested of driving under the influence of 
alcohol. He pled guilty and was sentenced to prison. 
There is no evidence that Terry Northrup, or other 
supervisory or managerial employees or officers of NAC/ knew 
that the defendant Rogers had a drinking problem in April of 
1982/ or was other than the exemplary employee he had been 
since he came to work for NAC. There is deposition testimony 
to the effect that some employees and ex-employees of NAC had 
seen Rogers drinking. It is significant to note that most of 
such testimony is contained in depositions of ex-NAC employees 
who had not been on the night shift when Rogers was a driver, 
and would not be in a position to testify as to Rogers' 
activities. Most of the testimony cited by Appellants' brief 
with regard to the subject of Rogers' drinking is by former NAC 
employees who had been fired by NAC prior to the time that 
Rogers was transferred to the night shift. Michael Mann, whose 
deposition testimony is cited frequently by the 
plaintiff-appellants brief on the subject of Donald Rogers' 
drinking/ was employed by NAC from January/ 1980 until February 
of 1981 (Mann, 1984/ page 8). Mann was assigned to the night 
-7-
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shift (Id.) and only occasionally worked on the day shift 
(Mann, 1984, page 12). During all of the period of Michael 
Mann's employment by NAC, the defendant Donald Rogers was 
working on the day shift (Mann., 1984, p. 17, 58). Rogers was 
not assigned to the night shift as a driver until January of 
1982, almost one year after Michael Mann had been fired (Mann, 
1984, p. 68; Rogers 1984, p. 21). Joseph Augestine (Augie) 
Moyer went to work for NAC in September of 1979, and was fired 
on January 8, 1982, before Rogers was assigned to the night 
shift as a driver (Moyer, page 5). David Jacobsen worked for 
NAC from June 6, 1978 to July 17, 1980, only 2 months after 
Rogers was hired (Jacobsen, page 5). 
Parts of the "Statement of Facts" section of the brief 
of the plaintiff-appellants are exaggerated, and one need only 
go to the testimony cited as support for these exaggerated 
"facts" to see that the testimony does not support the 
conclusions purportedly drawn from them. 
Be that as it may, Judge Fishier, in addressing NAC's 
motion for Partial Summary Judgment, construed the facts in 
favor of the plaintiffs, and listed in his memorandum decision 
the factual inferences which, "construing the evidence in a 
light most favorable to the plaintiffs", were most damaging to 
NAC. Even so, Judge Fishier, found, and correctly so, as 
follows: 
-8-
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The only way to prove the intent or state of 
mind of an individual is to review covert 
[sic] actions of that person. The trier of 
fact may then, from those facts, infer what 
the state of mind or intent of the 
individual was at the time in question. The 
inference must be a reasonable one. After a 
review of all the evidence presented, this 
court holds that the minds of reasonable men 
could not differ, and reasonable men would 
have to conclude that there was no intent on 
the part of NAC to injure anyone, nor did 
NAC act with an evil intent. Philip R. 
Fishier, District Judge, Memorandum 
Decision, Johnson v. Rogers, March 25, 1985, 
p. 7. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court's granting of partial summary judgment 
to NAC on the issue of punative damages should be upheld 
because an employer should only be held liable in punitive 
damages for the tortious conduct of an employee where the 
employer, acting through its managerial personnel, is 
independently guilty of conduct warranting punative damages. 
The correct law on this point is stated in the Restatement of 
Torts 2nd and is best expressed in the line of cases on point 
from the state of New Mexico. The evidence in this case does 
not show that NAC was independently guilty of conduct 
warranting punative damage, and did not authorize, ratify or 
participate in the conduct of the defendant Rogers. NAC was 
-9-
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not reckless in hiring or retaining Rogers, did not intend to 
injure anyone, and did not act with an evil intent. Punative 
damages may not be awarded in Utah without evidence of malice, 
ill will or evil motive. 
The trial court's denial of NAC's motion for partial 
summary judgment against the plaintiff Ray C. Johnson on the 
claim for damages for emotional distress should be reversed 
because Utah does not recognize a cause of action for emotional 
distress and Ray C. Johnson in this case would be barred from 
bringing such a claim by the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance 
Act because he did not incur medical expenses in excess of five 
hundred dollars. 
ARGUMENT 
I. AN EMPLOYER CAN BE HELD LIABLE IN PUNITIVE ( 
DAMAGES FOR THE TORTIOUS CONDUCT OF AN EMPLOYEE 
ONLY WHERE THE EMPLOYER, ACTING THROUGH ITS 
MANAGERIAL PERSONNEL, IS INDEPENDENTLY GUILTY OF 
CONDUCT WARRANTING PUNITIVE DAMAGES. 
This court has not directly addressed as a discreet < 
issue under what circumstances, if any, an employer can be held 
liable in punitive damages for the tortious conduct of an 
employee. There are a number of points of view on the issue < 
among other jurisdictions. The rule of pure vicarious 
liability, which would allow for punitive damages in any case 
i 
-10-
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where the employer is liable in compensatory damages, is 
clearly the minority point of view. 
The rule of the Restatements, also known as the 
complicity or ratification rule, has been adopted by a majority 
of courts in this country. Restatements (Second) Torts § 909 
(1979) and Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 217 (1958). This 
rule imposes punitive liability only if an employer or 
managerial agent authorizes or ratifies the acts of the agent, 
or if the employer was reckless in employing or retaining the 
agent. 
The "some fault" standard adopted by Florida, and 
urged in the plaintiff-appellant's brief, seems to be a 
singular expression of its reasoning. 
Four states apparently do not allow punitives at all. 
See Brines v. HYSIOP, 337 N.W.2d 858, 864-865 (1983), and 
cases cited therein. 
One of the most clear expressions of the Restatement 
position, and one which appears to be most suited to the 
position on punitive damages generally which has been adopted 
by the Utah Supreme court, is found in a line of cases from the 
State of New Mexico. 
The New Mexico cases derive from an opinion of the 
Supreme Court of the United States, Lake Shore & Michigan 
-11-
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Southern Railway Company v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101, 13 S. Ct. 
1261, 37 L. Ed. 97 (1893), which held: 
Exemplary or punitive damages, being 
awarded, not by way of compensation to the 
sufferer, but by way of punishment of the 
offender, and as a warning to others, can 
only be awarded against one who has 
participated in the offense. A principal, 
therefore, though of course liable to make 
compensation for injuries done by his agent, 
within the scope of his employment, cannot 
be held liable for exemplary or punitive 
damages, merely by reason of wanton, 
oppressive, or malicious intent on the part 
of the agent. 147 U.S. at 107. 
Mr. Justice Gray, in delivering the opinion of the 
Supreme court in Lake Shore, analyzed the case law of federal 
and state jurisdictions up to that time and distinguished 
between compensatory damages and punitive damages as against a 
principal for the acts of an agent on the basis of the 
jurisprudential rationale for the awarding of the two types of 
damages. The agent, acting in the course and scope of his 
i 
employment, is furthering the business of the principal, acting 
for the principal's benefit, and so the principal should be 
economically liable for compensating those damaged by the 
< 
agentfs acts. Punitive damages, unlike compensatory damages, 
are designed to punish specific criminal-like conduct and to 
deter other such conduct. The agent, in acting from criminal 
-12-
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or near criminal motives, is not furthering the business of the 
principal/ or acting for his benefit/ and so the rationale for 
respondeat superior damages does not apply. It is necessary, 
then# to find the same wrongful motives on the part of the 
principal/ or to find that the principal participated in, or 
ratified the acts of the agent in order to find a basis for 
awarding punitive damages against the principal. 147 U.S. 
106-117. 
New Mexico has relied on the sound reasoning and 
analysis of the U. S. Supreme Court's Lake Shore opinion in a 
series of cases including Stewart v. Potter, 44 N.M. 460/ 104 
P.2d 736 (1940); Sanchez v. Securities Acceptance Corp., 57 
N.M. 512/ 260 P.2d 703 (1953); Couillard v. Bank of New Mexico, 
89 N.M. 179/ 548 P.2d 459 (Ct. App. 1976); Samedan Oil Corp. v. 
Neeld, 91 N.M. 599, 577 P.2d 1245 (1978); Cornell v. 
Albuquerque Chemical Co., Inc., Ct. App. N.M.# 584 P.2d 168 
(1978); Ruiz v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., Ct. App. 
N.M., 638 P.2d 406 (1981); and Campen v. Stone, Wyoming/ 635 
P.2d 1121 (1981). 
A good summary of the New Mexico rule is contained in 
Samedan: 577 P.2d at 1247-58: 
The rule is well established in New 
Mexico that the principal/ or master, is 
-13-
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liable for punitive or exemplary damages 
only in cases where the principal or master 
has some way authorized, participated in or 
ratified the acts of the agent or servant, 
which acts were wanton, oppressive, 
malicious, fraudulent or criminal in 
nature," Couillard v. Bank of New Mexico, 
89 N.M. 179, 181, 548 P.2d 459, 461 (Ct. 
App. 1976). This rule is derived from a 
long line of New Mexico case law, of which 
Stewart v. Potter, 44 N.M. 460, 104 P.2d 736 
(1940) is the leading decision. The meaning 
of Stewart v. Potter was very clearly 
expressed in a subsequent case, Sanchez v. 
Securities Acceptance Corp., 57 N.M. 512, 
260 P.2d 703 (1953), where it was said: 
The question of the liability of a 
principal for punitive damages, as 
distinguished from compensatory 
damages, arising out of the actions of 
his agent, has already been passed upon 
by this Court. Justice Mabry, in the 
case of Stewart v. Potter, 44 N.M. 460, 
104 P.2d 736, specifically dealt with 
the two lines of authority now existing 
on this question, and adopted as the 
law of New Mexico the rule set out by 
the United States Supreme Court in Lake 
Shore & M.S. Railway Co. v. Prentice, 
147 U.S. 101 [13 S. Ct. 261, 37 L.Ed. 
97] * * * This rule as quoted from the 
case by Justice Mabry, is as follows 
[44 N.M. 460, 104 P.2d 740]: 
"Exemplary or punitive damages, 
being awarded, not by way of 
compensation to the sufferer, but 
by way of punishment of the 
offender, and as a warning to 
others, can only be awarded 
against one who has participated 
in the offense. A principal, 
therefore, though of course liable 
to make compensation for injuries 
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done by his agent, within the 
scope of his employment, cannot be 
held liable for exemplary or 
punitive damages, merely by reason 
of wanton, oppressive, or 
malicious intent on the part of 
the agent." 
Justice Mabry went on to state that, 
absent participation, authorization or 
ratification of the tortious act of the 
agent, the principal cannot be held 
liable for punitive damages. There 
must be proof in the cause to implicate 
the principal and make him particeps 
criminis of is agent's act. 
57 N.M. at 516, 260 P.2d at 706. To state 
the same principle more succinctly, we have 
adopted the rule that a master or principal 
is not liable for punitive damages unless it 
can be shown that in some way he also has 
been guilty of the wrongful motives upon 
which such damages are based. 
It is submitted that, rather than following the 
nebulous "some fault" rule of Florida, this court would well 
rely for guidance upon the well grounded, well reasoned, 
consistent and logical line of cases in accord with the 
majority Restatement position from our neighboring state of New 
Mexico, and hold that H. . .a master or principal is not 
liable for punitive damages unless it can be shown that in some 
way he also has been guilty of the wrongful motives upon which 
such damages are based." Samedan Oil Corp. v. Neeld, 577 P.2d 
at 1248. 
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Under the rule of the Restatements, the facts of the 
case before the Court are insufficient to support an award for 
punitive damages. There is no evidence that NAC "authorized 
the doing and the manner of the act/0 or that the agent, 
Rogers, "was employed in a managerial capacity," or that NAC 
"ratified or approved the act." The only possible grounds for 
recovery of punitive damages under the Restatements is if "the 
agent was unfit and the principal or a managerial agent was 
reckless in employing or retaining him." 
There is no evidence that NAC was reckless in hiring 
or retaining Rogers. Rogers came highly recommended by his 
i 
previous employer, McQuaid Towing, and had a valid Utah 
chauffeur's license. Rogers* Utah driver's license record gave 
no indication of his conviction for drunken driving some years 
before in Oregon (Northrup, 1983, p. 12). NAC justifiably 
relied upon these facts in hiring Rogers. NAC's actions were 
not negligent in this regard, let alone reckless. 
< 
Likewise, the facts of the case do not indicate that 
NAC was reckless in retaining Rogers in its employ during the 
period of time immediately preceding the accident. Rogers had 
been an exemplary employee upon which his supervisor relied 
(Northrup, 1983, pp 35-38). Rogers was never reported for 
being intoxicated or drinking on the job, nor had any other 
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disciplinary actions on his employment record been taken. 
(Northrup 1983/ pp. 18-19). There is no evidence that NAC knew 
that Rogers had developed a drinking problem. There is 
evidence that other NAC employees drank or smoked marijuana, 
and some ex-employees now implicate Rogers in such activity. 
There is no evidence that NAC supervisors had any knowledge of 
such activities by Rogers, or failed to take appropriate action 
against such activities by others. The fact that NAC had 
previously fired the ex-employees so testifying as to their own 
transgressions indicates that NAC was acting responsibly in 
trying the curb such activity, not the reverse. 
What is needed for the plaintiff-appellants to prevail 
on their claim for punitive damages is evidence relating to the 
retention of Rogers as an employee—not evidence relating to 
other employees. There is no evidence that NAC knew that 
Rogers had developed a drinking problem and was, therefore, 
unfit to be employed as a driver. Without a showing of such 
knowledge, there can be no finding of "reckless retention" of 
Rogers as an employee and no basis for punitive damages against 
NAC under the Restatement standard. 
Restatement paragraph (b), the reckless hiring or 
retention of an unfit employee, is not in reality the awarding 
of punitive damages against a "principal because of an act by 
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an agent," but rather the awarding of damages based on the 
independent act of the principal. What the Restatement 
paragraph is dealing with is the actual liability of the 
principal/ because the focus is on the principal's reckless 
conduct• See Ghiardi and Kircher, Punitive Damages Law and 
Practice, § 5.10/ p. 33. The standard, therefore, must be the 
same standard for awarding punitive damages in any case. The 
employer's actions must be measured by the Utah punitive 
damages standard of malice, ill will or evil motive. 
II. PUNITIVE DAMAGES MAY NOT BE AWARDED IN UTAH 
WITHOUT EVIDENCE OF MALICE, ILL WILL OR EVIL 
MOTIVE. ^ 
Plaintiffs/Appellants have urged this Court to adopt a 
position that "reckless disregard for the safety of others can 
be the basis for punitive damage recovery." (Appellants* ( 
opening Brief/ pg. 15-16). Such a holding would be contrary to 
established Utah law and would allow plaintiffs to use the 
threat of a punitive damage award as an "jln terrorem weapon" in f 
every negligence case. 
The law in Utah regarding the awarding of punitive 
damages has developed over a number of years. However, each of I 
the cases has established that the awarding of punitive damages 
has required malice, ill will, or evil motive. "Punitive 
i 
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damages are not awarded for mere inadvertence, mistake, errors 
of judgment and the like, which constitute ordinary 
negligence." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908 comment b at 
465 (1979). A review of the Utah Case law on punitive damages 
clearly establishes that this Court has long followed the 
standard. 
In Murphy v. Booth, 36 Ut. 285, 103 Pac. 768 (1909), 
plaintiff filed a claim against defendant alleging malicious 
prosecution. Plaintiff contended that defendant had instituted 
a criminal complaint against plaintiff alleging that plaintiff 
had obtained money under false pretenses. Plaintiff further 
alleged that defendant's action was "falsely, wickedly and 
maliciously" contrived with the intent to injure plaintiff, 
without any reasonable or probable cause. In the trial on the 
malicious prosecution claim, the trial court charged the jury 
that: 
If you find from the evidence that the 
defendant caused plaintiff to be arrested 
for the purpose of assisting defendant in 
collecting a claim for moneys which 
defendant thought he had against plaintiff, 
or to compel the delivery of property, or to 
satisfy some grudge or hatred, or to 
accomplish some other ulterior or wrongful 
purpose, then it was begun maliciously as 
though inspired by revenge. 103 Pac. at 770 
(emphasis added). 
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The award of punitive damages, although reduced by the trial 
court/ was affirmed on appeal* The Utah Supreme Court adopted 
the rule suggested by the appellant that: 
Exemplary, punitive or vindictive damages 
are such damages as are in excess of the 
actual loss, and are allowed where a tort is 
aggravated by evil motive, actual malice, 
deliberate violence, oppression or fraud. 
103 P. 770 (citing appellant's brief) 
(emphasis added). 
In order to sustain an award of punitive damages, therefore, 
the Murphy case required the establishment of a state of mind 
which evidenced evil motive, actual malice, deliberate 
violence, oppression or fraud. 
In Evans v. Gainsford, Utah, 247 P.2d 431 (1952), the 
plaintiff brought an action against the defendant for assault 
and battery. The court awarded plaintiff $500.00 in special 
damages, $500.00 in general damages and $1,499.95 in punitive 
damages. In addressing the issue of punitive damages, the 
court affirmed: 
Punitive or exemplary damages are awarded as 
a punishment to defendant for malicious 
conduct, and as a wholesome warning to 
defendant and others not to engage in 
similar indiscretions. 247 P.2d at 434 
(emphasis added). 
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In Holland v. Moreton, 10 Ut.2d 390, 353 P.2d 989 
(I960), an action was brought by a mining claim vendor against 
his agent for alleged fraud in connection with the agent's sale 
of the claims. The court said: 
Where there is a wrong involving the 
violation of a duty springing from a 
relation of trust or confidence and the 
wrong is of a gross and aggravated nature 
the malicious conduct necessary to justify 
punitive damages may be found (footnote 
omitted). In submitting the issue of 
punitive damages the court correctly 
instructed the jury that they could award 
such damages only if they found that 
Moreton's conduct was willful and 
malicious. 353 P.2d at 995 (emphasis added). 
Even where there was a relationship of trust between the 
parties, the Court still required a state of mind which 
evidenced malice and willful conduct. 
In Smoot v. Lund, 13 Ut.2d 168, 369 P.2d 933 (1962), 
an action was instituted alleging fraud and seeking a 
reformation of a contract. The court recognized, and affirmed, 
that punitive damages "may be awarded only where a willful and 
malicious injury has been perpetrated." Id. at 936. The Utah 
Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the claim for exemplary 
damages. 
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In Powers v. Taylor, 14 Ut.2d 152, 379 P.2d 380 
(1963), the plaintiff brought an action for damages caused by 
the defendant's horses trespassing on plaintiff's property. 
The evidence showed that "even after repeated warnings and 
remonstrances the defendants wrong continually persisted with 
indifference to the consequences and to plaintiffs rights" and 
the trial court submitted the issue to the jury as to whether 
the conduct was willful and malicious. The Court held that the 
finding of willfulness and the finding of malice was supported 
by the evidence. The court sustained the awarding of $1,500.00 
as punitive damages upon the finding of the deliberate, willful 
conduct. 
In Palombi v. D & C Builders, 22 Ut.2d 297, 452 P.2d 
325 (1969), the plaintiff sued for damages to his house caused 
by faulty workmanship in installing aluminum siding. In 
rejecting plaintiffs claim for punitive damages, the court 
indicated that it must appear "not only that there was a 
wrongful invasion of plaintiffs rights, but that it was done 
willfully and maliciously." 452 P.2d at 328. 
In Prince v. Peterson, Utah, 538 P.2d 1325 (1975), the 
Utah Supreme Court in reducing a $3,000.00 punitive damage 
award by two-thirds, awarded for slanderous statements made by 
the defendant, again acknowledged that punitive damages may be 
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awarded only if "the jury finds that such injury was willful 
and malicious, (footnote omitted)" Id. at 1329. 
In Kesler v. Rogers, Utah, 542 P.2d 354 (1975) the 
plaintiff sought punitive damages against the defendant, 
alleging "willful and malicious conduct in claiming ownership 
of the land and removal of cattle." In recognizing the award 
of punitive damages, but reducing the award by half, the court 
addressed the purposes of punitive damages and stated that 
"they are: a punishment of the defendant for a particularly 
grievous injury caused by conduct which is not only wrongful, 
but which is willful and malicious . . . " Id. at 359. 
Prior to 1979, then, it is clear that a jury could 
only award punitive damages if it found defendant's conduct to 
be willful and malicious. A finding simply that plaintiff's 
rights were violated was insufficient to support a punitive 
damage award. Only if actual malice could be demonstrated 
could the award stand. 
In Terrv v. Z.C.M.I., Utah, 605 P.2d 314 (1979); 
modified 617 P.2d 700 (1980), a customer brought a malicious 
prosecution, false arrest and false imprisonment action against 
a merchant. In discussing whether the plaintiff was entitled 
to a punitive damage award under the facts of that case, the 
court recognized the general rule then existing in Utah: 
-23-
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Generally in personal injury cases the rule 
is that before the jury can award punitive 
or exemplary damages the party against whom 
the damages are to be awarded must have 
acted willfully and maliciously. Id. at 327. 
The court then went on to recognize an exception to the rule in 
false imprisonment cases. The language of the decision, by its 
own terms, was to apply only to false imprisonment cases. 
Relying on a North Dakota case, Remmick v. Mills, 165 N.W. 2d 
61, 71 (N.D. 1968) the court stated: 
[I]t has long been the rule that in false 
imprisonment cases punitive damages may be 
awarded when a wrongful act is done 
recklessly or in open disregard of one's 
civil obligations and the rights of others, 
[footnote omitted] 
This presumed malice or malice in law does 
not consist of personal hate or ill will of 
one person towards another but rather refers 
to that state of mind which is reckless of 
law and of the legal rights of the citizen 
in a person's conduct towards that citizen, 
[footnote omitted] Therefore, in false 
imprisonment cases the defendant need not 
act with actual ill will or hatred towards 
the person being confined. In such cases 
malice in law will be implied from 
unjustifiable conduct which causes the 
injury complained of or from a wrongful act 
intentionally done without cause or excuse, 
[footnote omitted] (Emphasis added) 605 
P.2d at 327. 
The court then concluded that the jury determination 
that Z.C.M.I. had failed to fall within the immunity granted by 
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Utah Code Annotated § 77-13-32 because its arrest of Doris 
Terry was unjustified and without probably cause, then 
established the requisite "state of mind," i.e., "implied 
malice" for recovery of punitive damages. The focus of the 
inquiry was on the state of mind and intent (unreasonable 
detention of a customer without probable cause) of the store 
employees. 
The fact that Terry was specifically limited, by its 
own terms, to false imprisonment cases was made clear later 
that same year. In Elkinoton v. Foust, Utah, 618 P.2d 37 
(1980), an adopted daughter filed an action against her 
stepfather seeking damages for sexual assault and abuse which 
had occurred over a number of years. In affirming an award of 
punitive damages, the court stated: 
Punitive damages may be awarded where the 
nature of the wrong complained of and the 
injury inflicted goes beyond merely 
violating the rights of another in that it 
is found to be willful and malicious. They 
are allowed as a punishment to the offender 
and as a warning to him and others not to 
engage in similar vexatious actions, 
[footnote omitted] (emphasis added) 618 at 
41. 
The court, besides referring to the "innate evils" of 
Defendant's conduct, focused on the "willful and malicious" 
conduct and to "vexatious actions," of the defendant in 
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affirming the punitive damage award. In this type of case 
(i.e., non-false imprisonment case), the court did not follow 
the "reckless indifference, malice in law" standard adopted in 
Terry. Rather, the Court required a finding of willful and 
malicious conduct. 
In First Security Bank of Utah v. J.B.J. Feed Yards, 
Utah, 653 P.2d 591 (1982), the Court again affirmed the 
"willful and malicious" standard in cases other than false 
imprisonment cases. In that case, a bank brought an action 
against a feed yard and attached certain cattle kept in the 
feed yard, some of which were later found to belong to an 
intervenor who filed a motion to quash the writ of attachment 
and claimed wrongful attachment. Damages were awarded for the 
wrongful attachment to the intervenor. In discussing the award 
of $100,000.00 in punitive damages to the intervenor, the court 
stated: 
Punitive damages constitute "an 
extraordinary remedy . . . outside the field 
of usual redressful remedies" which "should 
be applied with caution lest, engendered by 
passion or prejudice because of defendant's 
wrongdoing, the award becomes unrealistic or 
unreasonable." [footnote omitted] Such 
damages may be awarded "where the nature of 
the wrong complained of and the injury 
inflicted goes beyond merely violating the 
rights of another in that it is found to be 
willful and malicious, [footnote omitted]" 
(Emphasis added), id. at 598. 
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Again# the court affirmed the standard for imposing punitive 
damages to be a "willful and malicious1* standard/ not a 
"reckless indifference" standard. 
In November/ 1982/ the Utah Supreme Court issued its 
decision Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc., Utah/ 657 P.2d 267 
(1982). In that case, a property owner sued adjoining 
landowners for pollution of plaintiff's culinary water wells 
caused by percolation of oil well formation waters which 
defendant had pooled on its property. Defendant then 
compounded the plaintiff's problems by continued trespass on 
their land/ the spraying of waste water over their land/ and 
the failure to comply with state law. In that case, for the 
first time, in a non-false imprisonment case, the Utah Supreme 
Court rejected Western's claim that punitive damages were 
appropriate only when willful and malicious conduct is shown 
and expressed and relied on the "reckless indifference and 
disregard" standard originally adopted in Terry v. Z.C.M.I., 
supra. The Court held that Western's discharge of waste water 
into the disposal pit/ intending that it seep into and 
percolate through the soil/ was willful/ intentional and 
carried out in disregard of the plaintiff's rights. The 
conduct was sufficient to support a finding of a state of mind 
evidencing a knowing disregard of plaintiff's rights. 
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In Behrens v. Raleigh Hills, Utah, 675 P.2d 1179 
(1983) the Utah Supreme Court again applied the Terry standard 
in a non-false imprisonment case. In Behrens the plaintiff 
brought a wrongful death action against Raleigh Hills Hospital 
seeking compensatory damages. The evidence established that on 
the third day of plaintiff/decedent•s admission to the 
hospital, a hospital employee allowed the decedent to use a 
razor to shave. Instead, decedent used the razor to slash his 
wrists and died four days later. In discussing the standard 
for the imposition of punitive damages, the Utah Supreme Court 
stated: 
Our cases have generally held that punitive 
damages may be awarded only on proof of 
"willful and malicious," conduct (citations 
omitted), or on proof of conduct which 
manifests a knowing and reckless 
indifference toward, and disregard of the 
rights of others, Branch v. Western 
Petroleum, Inc., supra; Terrv v. Zions 
Cooperative Mercantile Institution, supra, 
675 P.2d at 1186 (emphasis added). 
It is interesting to note that the cases relied on for the 
"knowing and reckless indifference toward, and disregard of, 
the rights of others" standard are Terrv v. Z.C.M.I. (strictly 
limited to false imprisonment cases) and Branch (which relied 
on Terrv) only. Again, the Supreme Court did not say that mere 
reckless conduct itself would support a claim of punitive 
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damages. Only if such reckless conduct evidenced "a knowing 
and reckless indifference toward, and disregard of the rights 
of others" could such damages be awarded. 
In 1984, the Utah Supreme Court again had occasion to 
consider whether punitive damages were available in a false 
imprisonment case in McFarland v. Skaggs Companies, Inc., Utah, 
678 P.2d 298 (1984). After discussing the relevant case law 
and the scholarly reasoning in opposition to the Terry 
decision, the court stated: 
In light of the apparent weight of authority 
and persuasive scholarly reasoning in 
support of defendant's position, we find 
that a sufficient and sound basis exists for 
departing from the malice in law standard 
followed in Terry. Accordingly, we adopt as 
the appropriate standard for determining the 
availability of a punitive damage award in 
an action for false imprisonment that of 
"malice in fact" or "actual malice." L&. at 
304. 
Having expressly overturned Terry, the court impliedly 
overturned those decisions which rely on the Terry "malice in 
law" standard. Appellant now argues that the McFarland holding 
that punitive damages are available only upon a showing of 
"malice in fact" or "actual malice" is limited to false 
imprisonment cases. However, both Terry and McFarland limited 
the scope of their application to false imprisonment cases. 
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Those non-false imprisonment decisions which rely on Terry for 
support for "malice in law" standard were also overruled by 
McFarland. 
Several cases since McFarland have discussed a 
"reckless indifference" standard for the imposition of punitive 
damages• The cases do not state whether a "reckless disregard" 
standard is the standard for all non-false imprisonment cases, 
or whether a "reckless disregard" standard may be relied on 
only in an appropriate case. The cases do not state what 
degree of recklessness is required for the imposition of 
punitive damages. However, these cases clearly suggest that 
focus must be placed on the state of mind of the Defendant. 
Only if defendant's conduct is supportive of a state of mind 
evidencing a "knowing and reckless indifference" can an award 
of punitive damages stand. In Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching 
Company, Ltd., Utah, 701 P.2d 1106 (1985), for example, the 
Utah Supreme Court was faced with a case involving fraud, 
misrepresentation and deceit. The allegations of the complaint 
were not refuted. The court did indicate that: 
Punitive damages, among other things, punish 
conduct which manifests a knowing or 
reckless indifference toward, and disregard 
of, the rights of others. Id. at 1106. 
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recognizing a reckless indifference standard only if such 
conduct is knowing and is supportive of malice. 
In Atkin, Wright & Miles v. The Mountain States 
Telephone and Telegraph, 20 Utah Adv. Rep. 20 (1985), the Utah 
Supreme Court again had occasion to review an award of punitive 
damages. This Court in reversing the award of punitive 
damages, stated: 
Before punitive damages may be awarded, the 
plaintiff must prove conduct that is willful 
and malicious, Leigh Furniture and Carpet 
Co. v. Isom, Utah 657 P.2d 243, 312, (1982); 
First Security Bank of Utah v. T.B.J. 
Feedyards, Inc., Utah, 653 P.2d 591, 598 
(1982); Elkington v. Forest, Utah, 618 P.2d 
37, 41 (1980); Kesler v. Rogers, Utah, 542, 
P.2d 354, 359 (1975), or that manifests a 
knowing and reckless indifference and 
disregard toward the rights of others. 
Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc., Utah 657 
P.2d 267, 277-78 (1982); Terry y. Zions 
Cooperative Mercantile Institution, Utah 605 
P.2d 314, 327 (1979). 20 Utah Adv. Rep. at 
24
 0 
Again, the Court does not say that punitive damages are allowed 
for reckless conduct. Rather, the Court states that punitive 
damages are allowed for willful and malicious conduct, or 
conduct which manifests a Mknowing and reckless indifference 
towards the rights of others" (i.e., state of mind as evidenced 
by the conduct)• 
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Mere careless, negligent or even reckless conduct, 
without evil motive or design, will not support an award of 
punitive damages. Recklessness can only be a basis for 
punitive damages if such recklessness is supportive of malice 
or a state of mind evidencing a knowing indifference to the 
rights of Appellant. This standard is consistent with the 
recent pronouncements by this Court, and is consistent with the 
large body of Utah law dealing with punitive damages. 
Adoption of a standard suggested by Appellant 
("reckless disregard for the safety of others can be the basis 
for punitive damage recovery" Appellant brief pg. 15-16) would 
allow the threat of punitive damages to be used as an in 
terrorem weapon in every negligence case. 
The distinction between "negligence," "carelessness" 
and "recklessness" are so fine that they are not subject to 
precise definition. 
"Negligence" has been defined as*: 
The omission to do something which a 
reasonable man, guided by those ordinary 
considerations, which ordinarily regulate 
human affairs, would do, or the doing of 
something which a reasonable and prudent man 
would not do. 
"Carelessness" has been defined as*: 
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Synonymous with "negligent,M the latter 
being probably the better word in 
pleadings. Absence of ordinary or proper 
care* Reckless. (Emphasis added). 
"Reckless" is defined as*: 
Not recking; careless, heedless, 
inattentive; indifferent to consequences. 
According to circumstances it may mean 
desperately heedless, wanton or willful, or 
it may mean only careless, inattentive, or 
negligent. 
Because the definitions of each of these words blend, overlap, 
and are often used synonymously, it is difficult to determine 
under what circumstances "recklessness" would be the basis for 
an award of punitive damages and under what circumstances it 
wouldn'tc Appellant contends that in any negligence case 
reckless conduct may form a basis for an award of punitive 
damages. If that position were adopted, in any case of simple 
negligence, a plaintiff would attempt to obtain an award of 
punitive damages by the semantical interplay of "careless or 
negligent" conduct with "reckless" conduct. The threat of an 
* All references to Black's Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth 
Edition, citations omitted. 
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award of punitive damages, in simple negligence cases then 
becomes an in terrorem weapon in every negligence case. 
It is respectfully submitted that conduct which 
manifests "ill will, malice, intent or other evil design" only 
should support a claim for punitive damages. Mere reckless 
conduct, devoid of a knowing, malicious, or intentional state 
of mind, would not form the basis for such an award. 
Applying this standard to the facts of this case 
clearly establishes that the acts of the Newspaper Agency 
Corporation do not rise to the level of imposing punitive 
damages. Judge Philip R. Fishier, in his Memorandum Decision 
issued March 25, 1985 found: 
The only way to prove the intent or state of 
mind of an individual is to review covert 
[sic] actions of that person. The trier of 
fact may then, from those facts, infer what 
the state of mind or intent of the 
individual was at the time in question. The 
inference must be a reasonable one. After a 
review of all the evidence presented this 
Court holds that the minds of reasonable men 
could not differ and reasonable minds would 
have to conclude that there was no intent on 
the part of Newspaper Agency Corporation to 
injure anyone, nor did Newspaper Agency 
Corporation act with an evil intent. 
In dismissing the claim for punitive damages, therefore, Judge 
Fishier found that Newspaper Agency Corporation had not acted 
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willfully and maliciously, nor had Newspaper Agency Corporation 
engaged in such knowing and reckless conduct from which a 
finding of malice could be inferred. Judge Fishier8s decision 
was supported by the facts established through discovery. 
III. UTAH DOES NOT RECOGNIZE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR 
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
In Plaintiffs' second claim for relief in their 
Amended Complaint, Plaintiff Ray C. Johnson alleges a cause of 
action for the negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held on a number of 
occasions that a cause of action for emotional distress may not 
be based on mere negligence. Reiser v. Lohner, Utah, 641 P.2d 
93 (1982); see also Covert v. Kennecott Cooper Corporation, 23 
Utah 2d 252, 461 P.2d 466 (1969); and Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 
2d 289, 358 P.2d 344 (1961); and Jeppsen v. Jensen, 47 Utah 
536, 155 P.2d 429 (1916). 
In Jeppsen v. Jensen, supra., the defendant had come 
into the Jeppsen home where the plaintiff was weak and ill from 
a recent childbirth. As quoted in Samms v. Eccles, supra, in a 
"macabre scene" the defendant used violent and abusive language 
and continually threatened the plaintiffs husband with a 
revolver* The plaintiff was so terrified that she "fell into a 
swoon or faint, and was attacked by a nervous chill. . . so 
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that she became prostrated and was again confined to her bed 
for the greater part of two days.M The trial court granted a 
nonsuit. Upon appeal, Justice Frisk reviewed some pertinent 
authorities and quoted approvingly from Dunn v. Western Union 
Telegraph Co., 2 Ga. App. 845, 59 S.E. 189 (1907): 
While mental suffering, unaccompanied by 
injury to purse or person, affords no basis 
for an action predicated upon wrongful acts, 
merely negligent, yet such damages may be 
recovered in those cases where the plaintiff 
had suffered at the hands of the defendant a 
wanton, voluntary, or intentional wrong the 
natural result of which is the causation of 
mental suffering and wounded feelings. 
The trial court was reversed and the case remanded for a new 
trial because it could not be said as a matter of law that the 
defendant's conduct was not willful and wanton. 
In Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344 
(1961) a married woman sought damages for severe emotional 
distress which she claimed to have suffered as a result of the 
defendant's continued indecent proposals that she have illicit 
sexual relations with him. The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the 
status of the law of that time and held: 
Our study of the authorities, and of the 
arguments advanced, convinces us that 
conceding such a cause of action may not be 
based upon mere negligence, the best 
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considered view recognizes an action for 
severe emotional distress, though not 
accompanied by bodily impact or physical 
injury, where the defendant intentionally 
engaged in some conduct toward the 
plaintiff, (a) with the purpose of 
inflicting emotional distress, or, (b) where 
any reasonable person would have known that 
such would result; and his actions are of 
such a nature to be considered outrageous 
and intolerable in that they offend against 
the generally accepted standards of decency 
and morality [footnote omitted]. (Emphasis 
added) Id. at 46-47. 
In Covert v. Kennecott Copper Corporation, 23 Utah 2d 
252, 461 P.2d 466 (1969), the Court reaffirmed the Samms v. 
Eccles holding that a cause of action for the negligent 
infliction of emotional distress did not exist in Utah. In 
Reiser v. Lohner, supra., Plaintiffs had asserted a claim for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress. The trial court 
summarily dismissed the claim on the basis that such a claim is 
not recognized in the State of Utah. In supporting the action 
of the trial court, the Utah Supreme Court held: 
It is well established in Utah that a cause 
of action for emotional distress may not be 
based upon mere negligence, (footnote 
omitted) 641 P.2d at 100. 
Plaintiffs' second claim for relief seeks recovery for 
emotional distress. Plaintiffs have not alleged that 
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defendants intended to cause such distress. In point of fact, 
as set forth in Appellants* Opening Brief, Plaintiffs have 
conceded that they could not prove actual malice in this case. 
(Appellants' Opening Brief, page 15). There are no Utah cases 
which recognize a "zone of danger" exception to the rule that a 
claim for emotional distress cannot be based on mere 
negligence. This Court should, therefore, reverse the Order of 
the Trial Court and direct the trial court to dismiss this 
cause of action. 
IV. ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT A CLAIM FOR NEGLIGENT 
INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS MAY BE 
MAINTAINED, PLAINTIFFS ARE BARRED FROM BRINGING 
SUCH CLAIM BY THE UTAH NO-FAULT INSURANCE ACT. 
Since the claim of Ray C. Johnson for emotional 
distress arises out of an automobile/pedestrian accident which 
occurred in the State of Utah, such claim is subject to the 
provisions of the Utah No-Fault Insurance Act, U.C.A. 
§ 31-41-1, et sea. 
As part of the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act, 
Section 31-41-9(1) provides: 
(1) No person for whom direct coverage is 
provided for in this act shall be allowed to 
maintain a cause of action for general 
damages arising out of personal injuries 
alleged to have been caused by an automobile 
accident except where there has been caused 
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by this accident any one or more of the 
following: 
(a) Death; 
(b) Dismemberment or fracture; 
(c) Permanent disability; 
(d) Permanent disfigurement; or 
(e) Medical expenses to a person in 
excess of $500.00. 
In seeking compensation for the negligent infliction of 
emotional distress, plaintiff has alleged a separate cause of 
action from that of the cause of action for the wrongful death 
of his son. As such, the cause of action for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress must meet the threshold 
requirements of § 31-41-9(1) in order to be maintained. An 
analysis of the statute and law indicate that it does not. 
In Allstate v. Ivie, Utah, 606 P.2d 1197 (1980) the 
Utah Supreme Court had occasion to review Section 31-41-9. The 
Court observed: 
Under this statutory plan, first party PIP 
benefits up to the amounts provided in 
Section 6 are paid to an injured person 
without regard to fault. Furthermore, the 
injured party is precluded from maintaining 
an action to recover general damages (all 
damages other than those awarded for 
economic loss), [footnote omitted] except 
where the threshold requirements of Section 
9(i) are met. 606 P.2d at 1200. 
-40-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Only if an injured party exceeds the threshold requirement, 
therefore, can he maintain a cause of action for general 
damages. 
In this case, Ray C. Johnson's medical expenses for 
the personal injuries sustained by him fall short of the 
$500.00 threshold requirement. As such, he is precluded from 
maintaining a claim for general damages. 
A claim for emotional distress is recognized as an 
item of general damages. McGregor v. Barth, Oregon, 660 P.2d 
175 (1983); Garrett v. Olsen, Oregon, 691 P.2d 123 (1984). As 
quoted above, our Court has adopted this position and has held 
that "all damages other than those awarded for economic loss" 
are general damages. Allstate v. Ivie, supra. 
As an item of general damages, the claim for emotional 
distress cannot be relied on to establish one of the enumerated 
criteria to meet the threshold of § 31-41-9(1). Only when one 
has met the criteria set forth in § 31-41-9 in the form of 
special damages arising out of the personal injury can any 
action be maintained for general damages. To allow plaintiffs 
to assert general claims to meet the statutory threshold would 
circumvent the no-fault statute. In every case, plaintiff 
could allege "pain and suffering" and seek "counseling" for 
such complaint. Plaintiffs, by bootstrapping the general 
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damage claim, could circumvent the requirement of the special 
damage personal injury. 
In dealing with the precise issue, the Pennsylvania 
Superior Court recognized that emotional distress cannot be 
compensable under the Pennsylvania No-Fault Insurance Act. In 
the case of Zaqari v. Gralka, Pennsylvania, 399 A.2d 755 (1979) 
the Court dealt with an alleged claim under the Pennsylvania 
No-Fault Insurance Act for emotional distress. The 
Pennsylvania Act requires an injured party to meet a threshold 
by showing one of several enumerated criteria which are similar 
to those contained in the Utah Acto Although Appellants 
originally sought recovery for emotional distress, they 
conceded on appeal that emotional distress was not compensable 
under the no-fault act. 
It is submitted, therefore, that Utah does not 
recognize a claim for the negligent infliction of emotional 
distress. Without a showing of actual malice or intentional 
conduct toward the plaintiff which demonstrates an intent to 
inflict emotional distress, such claim cannot stand. Utah has 
never recognized a "zone of danger" exception to the general 
rule. 
Assuming arguendo, that such an exception did exist, 
plaintiff Ray C. Johnson did not meet the criteria established 
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by Utah Code Annotated § 31-41-9(1) in order to maintain a 
cause of action for general damages. Even if he were able to 
establish that he was within a "zone of danger," plaintiff 
would be required to establish that he had exceeded the 
limitation on tort action threshold criteria. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, and each of them, it is 
respectfully submitted that this Court should enter it's Order 
directing the District Court to dismiss Ray C. Johnson's claim 
for the negligent infliction of emotional distress, and 
upholding the District Court's Partial Summary Judgment on 
punitive damages. A 
DATED this 3& day of December, 1985. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH 
By. 
Edward J 
Attorney^ for Newspaper Agency 
Corporation 
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH 
/O 
By AL 
Lowell V. Smith 
Attorneys for Newspaper Agency 
Corporation 
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I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
*4 
prepaid, this 10 day of December, 1985, four true and 
correct copies of the foregoing Brief to the following: 
Gordon L. Roberts 
Julia C, Webb 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
P. 0. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Re Paul Van Dam 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
32 Exchange Place 
100 Commercial Club Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
P, Keith Nelson 
Attorney for Donald Rogers 
Suite 170 CSB Tower 
50 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
1572M 
EJM 
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HAU nui.ES ur gypiyuUT 
AND OFFICE RULES 
TO ALL N/X EMPLOYES 
IN ALL DEPARTMENTS 
Since you spend so many of your waking hours at your 
job here at NAC, it is obvious that a pleasant working 
environment is highly desirable. People of good sense prefer to 
live and work in an orderly way. Commonly accepted rules of 
conduct help maintain better relationships between you and 
your fellow workers and develop responsibility and self 
improvement. 
Herewith are 12 such rules, violation of any of which is 
just cause for discipline or discharge. Discipline is necessary in 
order to preserve good conditions for all employes. For minor 
offenses, an employe will be given corrective instruction or a 
verbal or written reprimand. Serious or repeated offenses will 
justify more severe correction action. Suspension or discharge 
will result from very serious or habitual violations. 
1. Dishonesty in any form or degree. 
2. Damage, loss or destruction of company, employe, or customer property 
due to careless or willful acts. 
3. Unauthorized removal or use of property belonging to the company, anv 
other employe, or any customer. 
4. Being under the influence of, or possessing or using alcohol or illegal 
drugs during work time. 
5 Loafing or sleeping on the job, inefficient performance of duties, 
incompetence or neglect of duty; being on premises at times other than 
assigned working hours. 
6. Failure or willful refusal to perform work as directed, insubordination. 
7. Negligence in observing fire prevention or safety regulations, or failure 
to report on-the-job injuries or unsafe conditions. 
8. Excessive or unexcused absence or tardiness. (This includes taking 
more than the allowable 10 minutes rest periods). 
9. Unwillingness or inability to work in harmony with others, discourteous, 
or conduct creating disharmony, irritation or friction. 
10. Fighting, gambling, horseplay or using profane, obscene or abusive 
language while at work, threatening, intimidating or coercing others on 
company premises or carrying unauthorized weapons. 
11. Soliciting or selling on company premises except when all concerned 
are relieved from duty. 
12. Violation of any other commonly accepted reasonable rule of 
responsible personal conduct. 
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